

**COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION
ON MICROFICHE

PART VI**

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IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK**

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
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Andor Skotnes
Acting Director

January 1988

No. 680

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COLUMBIA CRISIS

Thomas S. Colahan

Oral History Research Office

Columbia University

1970

Form A

Dear Dr. Grele:

This letter will confirm my understanding and agreement with Columbia University with respect to my participation in a series of interviews conducted by the University's Oral History Research Office.

1. The interviews will be taped and a transcript made of the tapes. The tapes and transcript (collectively called the "Work") will be maintained by the University and made available by the University in accordance with University rules and general policies for research and other scholarly purposes.

2. I hereby grant, assign and transfer to the University all right, title and interest in the Work, including the literary rights and the copyright, except that I shall retain the right to copy, use and publish the Work in part or in full until the earlier of my death or 31 December 1999. ^{? year}

3. This letter contains our entire and complete understanding.

Very truly yours,

Thomas A. Colahan
Thomas Colahan

Date 24 July 1986

ACCEPTED AND AGREED:

THE TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK

By Janet Land Run

Vice Dean Thomas Colahan

by Gordon Slovit

201 Hamilton Hall, Columbia University

Session I, May 17, 1968

Q: This is an interview with Thomas C. Colahan, vice dean of Columbia College, conducted in his office, 201 Hamilton Hall, beginning at 11:05 AM, May 17, 1968. The interviewer is Gordon Slovit.

Dean Colahan, why don't we start with Tuesday, April 23?

Dean Thomas Colahan: All right. You'll have to excuse my cold. On the morning of April 23, we had a meeting of the Deans Office staff. The meeting was chaired by Dean Platt, who is not only the associate dean for student affairs of Columbia College, but the director of student life or student affairs for the University. This was in order to decide on what our conduct would be and what actions we would take in the light of the student rally that was to be led by SDS at 12:00 on Tuesday afternoon.

Q: Who else was present at the meeting?

Dean Thomas Colahan: Every male member of the Deans Staff.

Q: This is of Columbia College?

Colahan: The Dean of Columbia College; myself; the Director of Admissions; all the members of his staff; my assistant, Mr. Thompson; and all the assistant deans in the student affairs office; Mr. Kahn, the proctor. I may have missed somebody, but it was every male member that we have.

At that meeting there were obviously only about, at the outside, fifteen of us; and we were well aware, as we have been throughout the year, that we really did not have the power of police. All we had was the power of persuasion and the assumption that people would abide by whatever regulations were in force, those regulations having been published in the beginning of the year as to how demonstrations were to be conducted. At the meeting we just merely talked about what we could expect. We knew that the SDS people would rally on the Sundial. What made this meeting rather important, as against most other rallies that we have met about, is that the anti-SDS said that they were going to arrange themselves on the steps in front of Low Library so that SDS couldn't get into the building. Therefore, there was obviously a situation where you have some sort of friction, confrontation, and perhaps even violence. Our information on the stated object of the SDS meeting was to deliver a petition to Pres. Kirk, which, as I understand it, was ~~was~~ concerned with IDA or the gym or something. . . . I don't know exactly what the grounds of their petition were to be.

At this meeting, we canvassed various ways of trying to handle this situation. We tried to decide where we would be

physically during the rally, and it was decided at that point to ask the Vice-president Provost if he would meet with both groups, the SDS and the anti-SDS group -- I don't remember what their name was -- and discuss the issues that SDS intended to raise and discuss them in some place big enough to accommodate as many people as could show up for it. The way we ^{would} handle this is, when the rally began, within a few minutes of the rally's beginning, he ~~would~~ have a letter delivered to ~~whoever~~ was leading the SDS rally, presumably Mr. Rudd, and to whomever was the leader of the anti-SDS, up on the steps in front of Low, saying in effect: I, namely Vice-president David Truman, feel that it's important. I'd like to discuss these issues with you in McMillin, which would probably accommodate all of the people standing around.

It was felt that it was only fair to the SDS people to let them get their rally started, and then, after ten minutes or so of the rally, to hand this letter to Rudd. As to the actual events and my own participation in them on the twenty-third, ^{when} the rally started I went out and stood close to the Sundial for awhile to see what was going on and then went up and looked at the conservative group on the stairs just to see how many they were. I was informed that Low Library was going to be locked up, with only the south-west entrance, by the security office open.

Q: Who made that decision?

Colahan: My understanding of it was that it was the Vice-president and Dean Platt in his capacity as director of student life who

decided that. I thought it was a wise decision. It channeled access into the building. Also, it would mean that, if the SDS people came up the steps, came surging up from the Sundial to go in the main door, having the side door open would mean that they would be channeled around the conservative students sitting on the steps and would perhaps prevent the direct confrontation kind of thing.

I talked with a lot of faculty out on the Plaza. The faculty were asked to go out and quite a few of them showed up and were mingling with the students and so on. I think that it was at this point that one of those timing errors was made, inasmuch as the SDS rally started pretty ~~late~~ much on time at 12:00, but the letter from the Vice-president did not come out until about twenty, twenty-five minutes after 12:00. By this time, the SDS rally is heated up and the more militant types from the SDS group had been up, sort of feeling out where the weak spots were in the conservative front, where the faculty were, X where the administrators were, and trying to figure out what they were going to do. These were the more hot-headed types, I would assume, of SDS.

When the letter was delivered to Mr. Rudd on the Sundial, I was not down by that but I was up by the Alma Mater statue. I saw him get the letter, read it, and then apparently there was some discussion of it. From a distance, I could see that the crowd was very much undecided as to what it was going to do.

Then, the next thing that happened was that the SDS people came up the steps, the SDS and all of the others that were assembled

down there, led by the more militant young men, who had been sort of feeling out what the situation was above College Walk. At that point, I followed a group that looked like the most hot-headed: I followed the spear-head of the SDS group as they went up the steps.

There was a slight confrontation between a Negro student and one of the white students on the steps. The Negro student stepped over him and stepped on him, and a couple of punches were thrown. I broke that up, I believe, with the assistance of Prof. C. Lowell Harriss. . .no, I'm sorry, Prof. Ranum. Then I followed the SDS people as they surged around to the side doors. They discovered that the ~~MM~~ doors were locked to Low. Then I followed around to the security door. At that point, I was very close to the front of the crowd. In fact, I was just short of the security door. There was alot of battering against it. The crowd was very closely packed. I'd had experiences of this heretofore, during the NROTC demonstration -- I've forgotten when now, but three or four years ago or so -- and knew that it could be very dangerous. People could get hurt in there. Mr. Rudd was standing there sort of as if he wasn't quite sure what the next move was. So I suggested that he make some move to get the people out of there before they got hurt. He then walked over on the ledge. . . .

Q: Excuse me, did he reply to you?

Colahan: No. He just looked at me and decided that it probably was a good idea in his own mind to do something, rather than getting these people jammed up there. It was quite obvious that they weren't going to make it through into Low Library that way.

Rudd then went over and walked along the ledge by the tulips, just to the left of that south-west entrance, turned the trash can over and stood up on it, and sort of threw it out to the crowd: Where do we go next? In true participatory fashion, the crowd yelled a couple of places they could go. Rudd said that they had to have a program, and it was then decided that the program would be to go down to the gym site on Mornignside Drive just behind the Cathedral. The crowd then surged over there, and Prof. Ranum was with me at the time. He was standing right there when Rudd made this decision, and he would confirm roughly what I'm saying. I then sort of caught my breath and then decided that I'd best go over to the gym site and see what was going on.

Q: Did you hear Rudd say anything at that point?

Colahan: No. He had then left and gone with the spear-head of the group.

I got down to the gym site and was milling around.

Q: Excuse me a second. Was Ranum with you?

Colahan: No. He stayed behind.

Q: He could have heard something then from Rudd?

Colahan: Right. He may have heard something. I think that he will confirm that Rudd stood on top of the ^{trash} ~~garbage~~ can and there was this debate, and Rudd said, "We've got to have a program of some kind here." And the gym was obviously. . . I think that I could say that it was just the thought that came to mind from the mob in front of him, the crowd in front of him: Let's go to the gym site.

We got down to the gym site. I think, if I remember rightly, I walked down with Kevin Sullivan, the associate dean of Graduate Faculties. At the gym site there wasn't much activity up on Morningside Drive. It was down, as you face the gym site from ~~Morningside Drive~~ ^{Morningside} Drive, along the left fence of the gym, well down into the Park. So I went ~~down~~ ^{down} there and went through the crowd that was standing. They had torn down a considerable amount of fence by this time. So I went down there, and I went through the fence that was torn down. Prof. C. Lowell Harriss from the economics department had shown up by this time, and I think that ~~X~~ he is the one that is probably an eye-witness to what went on at that point. He would be able to confirm something of what I am saying.

I went in, to the gym site, where the police were lined up. They were lined up inside the gym site, in sort of a broken line. They weren't taking any action at this point, but the students were surrounding them. They were higher than them, up on the hill, inside the gym site. Then, there was a scuffle and one of the students

jumped among them, and the police sort of formed a circle, turned around, and tried to eject him. He apparently fought back, from what I could see, and the police decided that they had to arrest him. So two policemen took him off.

Q: These are City police?

Colahan: All that I'm telling you about now are City police.

But the police then had to turn around swiftly because the police had turned in among themselves to take care of the man who had jumped among them, and they were being closed in upon by the crowd. The sergeant, or whoever he was, told them to turn around and face out toward the crowd. Then there was. . . some of them had their bullyclubs out and pushed the crowd back with them. There was some striking of students, but nothing, that I could see, very hard. Just enough to make it clear that they would have to use force to protect themselves.

At that point, ~~XXXXXX~~ there was a stand-off in the middle of the gym site, and alot of yelling and screaming going on and so on and so forth, but no action. One police sergeant in plain-clothes, who was known to the students was being dickered with at that point to get the student who had been arrested. There was alot of talking back and forth there, but it was just a mill-around kind of scene. People were building up on the gym site. which is a very dangerous site, with excavations, big holes, equipment going and so on and so forth.

At that point, Rudd stepped forward and didn't apparently know what to do. He sort of was standing there. He was the self-proclaimed leader, but wasn't sure of what he wanted to do. He then asked the police if he could go up on a mound of dirt that would raise him up above the crowd and say something. The police weren't sure about what to do, and at that point I said, "He's the leader of the group. Let him go up there and say something so that you get them out of here." My concern here was not to have them confronting the City police, because sooner or later there would have been additional incidents. So Rudd got up and made some sort of a speech: Now we've got to do something else. . . again, an utterly unclear speech as to what he was going to do. He then told me that I was to do certain things in fifteen minutes, and I just looked at him because obviously these things weren't going to be done in fifteen minutes.

Q: These were what type of things?

Colahan: I don't know. . . stop the work on the gym, tell Pres. . . . I don't even remember. This was one of these high emotional moments, when all it was was that he was trying to pin it on ~~MEMBER~~ some member of the administration. I didn't even bother to reply to this, because it obviously was sheer rhetoric on his part.

At that point, he decided. . . Again, he threw it out to the crowd what they should do, and it was decided to go back to the Sundail on the campus and then talk about it. So we all climbed

back up the hill to Morningside Drive and I started back up towards 116th Street. AT the corner of 116th Street, a group of people who had been down at the site met with another group of people who were coming over from the camps, and there was alot of talk at the corner of 116th Street and Morningside. By that time, Ted Gold and, I believe, Ted Kaptchuk, two SDS boys, showed up with a bullhorn. There was considerable milling around. Nobody really knew what they were supposed to do at that point in the game, ~~XXXX~~ but it was decided to go back to the Sundial and to talk about what was to be done next.

They got back to the Sundial -- I followed them back to the Sundial -- and at that point in the game, it was decided that they would enter Hamilton Hall. They entered Hamilton Hall and took occupancy. I guess that this would be around 2:00 or so. I'm not sure of the time at that point. . .around 2:15. In Hamilton Hall, they sat down and there was alot of singing; and there was a mixed bag of people in Hamilton Hall, blacks, whites, alot of girls, opposition to the ~~XXXXXX~~ SDS was in Hamilton Hall. The situation was really very electric. It could have erupted at any moment into violence of one type or another. They then brought in a bullhorn and the speech making started. VArrious people made speeches -- Rudd, Schills, some people from the Citizenship Council (John Schills I believe his name is) -- and they started to hack out a program right there, as is their fashion.

Dean Coleman and I walked down, looked in the door, and so on to see what was going on. Dean Coleman decided that he would enter

his office. He would go in. First of all, he would say something to them. I don't know what he said to them. He went to his office door, stood in front of it, turned around, and I don't know what he said, because I decided that I had better go into my office because I didn't want my office occupied, because there were a number of documents in it -- budgets and so on -- that I didn't feel should be given in free access to anybody that walked in and decided to sit down in my office.

I will say, at that point, even though the thing hadn't begun to solidify and it was still possible to get these people out by one device or another, I began to think that we might be in for a bit of a siege here as far as people sitting down in Hamilton Hall. Throughout the afternoon, I kept tabs on what was happening in the hallway. I went out. It was clear that there had been a decision to sit down in Hamilton Hall and to stay, for some reason or another. At that point, I sort of tidied up my office, on the assumption that I wasn't going to be in it for awhile, and also took the decision -- I guess it was at about 4:00 or 4:30 in the afternoon -- that I had better call a faculty meeting of the Columbia College faculty and started that process. I felt that it would be wiser, rather than having the Dean call the faculty together, which one can do and which we had to power to do, to have faculty members. All you need is twenty signatures. In fact, we have called a faculty meeting on the request of one man. . . .[?]if the matter were important enough to do so. So it was a decision at about 4:30 and we went into action then.

Q: Excuse me, had someone suggested that to you?

Colahan: I decided it myself, and apparently it was a simultaneous decision in a number of other minds ~~apparently~~ ^{practically}. Prof. Galanter I think. . . I can't remember who called up about that too. It was practically simultaneous, to call a faculty meeting. It was probably either Silver or Galanter who called me about it.

I confirmed it with Coleman. I was in contact with Dean Coleman by telephone. It was clear that it was beginning to build up outside his door and he was going to be stuck in there unless he walked out. And there were questions of whether he could get out by 4:00 in the afternoon. I was dubious of it.

Some people wanted to call the faculty meeting for 7:30 that night. I felt that that would have been inappropriate because, first of all, the faculty is all over the place. The place was in turmoil. I didn't know how much longer I was going to be able to stay by my own phones. In ~~any~~ any case, we began to do the calling and get things organized for a faculty meeting to be held the next afternoon.

Now, I finally decided about 5:00 that ^{if} I wasn't going to be kept in my office -- it looked that that might be in the works for me -- that I had best get out with what I could. I took my faculty lists and my stated rules of the faculty and my copy of the statutes of the University and left, having secured what I could secure -- budgets and information to which students shouldn't be privy. During the night, I worked on getting the faculty organized ~~for~~ the meeting the next day. The faculty meeting would not be held

Low Library. It was to be held in 309 Havemeyer, which is more appropriate for this size faculty meeting. During Wednesday, it's sort of a blur as to what went on. I was primarily concerned with getting the faculty organized, working out the agenda, trying to figure out. . .making sure that every faculty member that could possibly be reached be reached. But, more important. . . now Wednesday comes more into focus because I was, in fact, doing two things at once. I was organizing a faculty ~~MM~~ meeting. I had no office at this point in the game. It was clear now that Coleman was in for keeps, until they decided to let him out. It was also clear that sometime around 5:30 in the morning the Negro students had decided to ask the white students to leave, for whatever reasons. I was not very knowledgeable about that. All that I know is that there was a change of command inside Hamilton. To show where my mind was, it took me awhile to find out that in fact the President's suite had been occupied.

But Wednesday morning, it was raining. I came over here around, I'd say, 8:45 and found alot of the faculty milling around along the John ^{Puray} Mitchell plaque out here at the west end of Hamilton Hall. It was raining hard and it was a dismal ~~MM~~ kind of scene. Nobody knew what was going on. It was quite clear that the faculty had to be filled in and filled in quickly. So I took it upon myself at that point to decide that we would take the faculty members who were standing around and take them over to the Graduate Students' Lounge in 301 Philosophy. It would be a place which would be central for them. It was dry.

It was big enough to accommodate them. There was a kitchen there where we could get coffee. So it seemed like the ideal place for them to go. I took them over there, and sent the word out, as best I could, that that was where the faculty of Columbia College was meeting.

My assumption at that point was that this was primarily a Columbia College event so to speak, a happening, and that it would be the Columbia College faculty that would have to handle it. Secondly, I wanted my faculty in one place, because I was going to have a meeting with them and I wanted them to know what was going to go on in the meeting and discuss some of it with them.

The faculty went over there. I think it was Prof. Bell, I think Prof. George Collins from art history, I think Prof. Rebay from Italian was there. It's hard to remember the faces. Some of them ~~me~~ come to mind. I got everybody in there that I could. I had been given some information from the administration in Low Library, which gave me a general picture of what was going on, that the President's suite had been occupied and so on, with the ~~my~~ end result that I was able, as best I could, ^{to} give the faculty a briefing as to where we stood as of 9:30 or 9:45 on Wednesday morning.

The faculty then sat around in there. They liked the idea of a place to be that was central to them. The faculty of Columbia College were, in effect, although they are spread all over campus, the administrative center for the College and the primary building

for the College in Hamilton Hall and there was a sense of being dispossessed. So they were happy to have some place to meet.

Throughout Wednesday the faculty just sort of sat around and talked. I took my secretary over there and set up. . .one hates to use the kind of military language that comes in here. . . but set up a "command post" that was adequate. People knew where I was located. I established with the central administration in Low Library where I would be. It seems that nobody complained about it. It was ~~appropriate~~ ^{appropriate} to have someplace for the faculty to be.

The rest of the day was taken up primarily with getting ready for the faculty meeting. We had the faculty meeting at 3:00 in the afternoon. A series of resolutions, worked out primarily, I would say, by Professors Bell and Silver and Wallerstein, were put on the floor. These resolutions seemed sound to me. The first three of them, if I remember rightly, were primarily concerned with saying that a University is not a battleground, that there were rules of conduct and that violence, even though it was claimed to be non-violence on the part of the students, was in fact "non-violent violence," as Prof. Hofstadter calls it. This taking over buildings and so forth was, in fact, a violent invasion of the life of the University and this was not appropriate. The fourth resolution was a resolution primarily concerned with setting up some kind of a tri-partite faculty, student, administration committee for Columbia College to examine the structure of the College to see what changes should be made. This had already been called for in the Silver Report in November. Prof. Schless, who had been a member

of the Silver Committee, had worked out a scheme that seemed feasible enough. It had been discussed in the Committee on Instruction; but Dean Coleman, I think appropriately, had decided not to move to immediate implementation of this scheme because, after all, he was only an acting dean. He did not wish to bind the hands of whoever the real dean would be. I concurred in this, and the Committee on Instruction concurred on this. So that, in fact, the promise was there, ~~MY~~ but the delivery had not been made ~~XXXX~~ for, what we considered, sound reasons. The fifth resolution was concerned with the gym, and this resolution pretty much said that the whole gym question should be re-examined and that there was matter here of deep concern and so on.

These were not heavily debated in the faculty at all. People felt that these were sound. One or two words were changed, but the important thing was the assertion that the University was an orderly community. The student demands, as then formulated were sort of discussed. Prof. Lipman Bers from the mathematics department, when it came to the question of IDA -- Prof. Bers has been a consistent opponent of the University association with IDA -- got up and said that, as far as he was concerned, the IDA and all of the outside relations of ~~XXX~~ the University, with businesses and government, were under consideration in the Henkin Committee, which grew out of the Silver Report, which had been approved as a committee by the Trustees and, I'm not quite sure but I believe by the President, and that all such things as the IDA were being considered by that Committee and that it was unfair to try to move that Committee faster than it was going. It was a complicated question, and when

you face the fact that the University's budget comes from the Federal Government, one has to think sensibly about these matters. . . not just expediently but sensibly. And Bers put it quite bluntly, that the IDA was not a material question in this matter, that whatever arrangement was to be made with IDA would be taken care of by the Henkin Report and that he would stand by the Henkin Report as the work of a duly constituted committee of the University and as a committee that was a clear response to a request made to the President by the faculty of Columbia College in November and December.

There was one thing that was said, though, that I think is very important to remember and which must go in as a matter of record here. Dean Fraenkel, Dean of the Graduate Faculties, did get up and remind the faculty of Columbia College that last ~~spring~~ ^{spring,} at one of its faculty meetings, ~~XXXX~~ ^{Prof.} George Collins of art history got up and put a motion before the faculty of Columbia College, calling for a review of the gym in Morningside Park. At that meeting, to that motion, there was not one seconder in the whole Columbia College faculty. I think that this is an important matter of record; obviously this did not sit well with the faculty, to be reminded of past actions, but there it was.

In any case, the set of resolutions was carried, and, in effect, if one looks back at this, the resolutions four and five--namely, four dealing with some form of a tri-partite body for Columbia College to examine its structure, and five, quite a clear statement that the gym would be reconsidered and work be stopped on it and so forth--are the two resolutions from which most other things

around here, that are happening right now, as of 17 May, are derived.

Wednesday evening, I don't think that I got home until about 4:00 AM on Thursday morning. Most of my time was spent in Low Library, discussing the situation with the President and the Vice-president Provost Dr. Truman, trying to decide what the various quantities meant. And one of the things that seemed to emerge from our discussions and from the negotiations that were already taking place with the various groups. . . . And it's at this point that my chronology gets thrown off a bit because I can't remember when Fayerweather was taken over and Avery was taken over ^{and} ~~and~~ Mathematics was taken over. But I still think that at that point, Wednesday night and Thursday in the early morning until 4:00 AM, these things had not happened. But it was quite clear already, with SDS and its supporters sitting in the President's suite in Low Library and with the Negro students now in firm control of Hamilton Hall, that there were two different negotiating groups involved. I think that, as a matter of simple tactics, one would divide these groups in any case, and that was the way it was tackled. As it turned out, in the event anyway, the Negroes in Hamilton Hall did not want to be dealt with in the same way and did not see themselves as in ^{any way} ~~no way~~ bound to SDS. SDS and their supporters were trying to bind themselves into the Negro students, primarily probably because, if it came to threats to the University, as there already were threats in the ~~MM~~ occupation of its buildings, that the all white SDS and supporter groups might

be able to use the threat of calling in the Harlem community to their aid.

Negotiations were going on with the students in Hamilton Hall. It was clear that their demand rested primarily on the gym. Then began the problem of trying to formulate ~~some~~ a trustworthy, in their eyes trustworthy, arrangement ~~and~~ ^{for} trying to settle the gym matter.

Time blurs here now. . . .

Q: Was the idea to give them approximately what they wanted on the gym?

Colahan: I think that early on it was decided among the group of us sitting in Low Library that the gym was clearly a negotiable item. I know that there were those in the higher administration who felt that it was not a negotiable item, but, in the face of the facts, I think that people began to see that, in fact, rather than have your University destroyed. . . . And there were those of us -- I must confess to this myself -- who have been consistent opponents of the gym for the simple reason that we did not feel that an arrangement negotiated ~~ten~~ years ago with the then West Harlem community was a viable arrangement with the present West Harlem community. There were also those of us who feel that every inch of New York City parkland is damned near sacred and that this was clearly an invasion of the City parkland. My own position on this has been made known and had reached a point in my own personal dealings with the administration that this was one matter which we

did not discuss because it was quite clear where I stood.

Q: And the faculty also?

Colahan: And there was a considerable element in the faculty who were opposed to the gym but, again, expediency comes into this thing, and, as is clear from what Dean Fraenkel reminded the faculty of, the faculty was not ready to go down the line in opposition.

But my memory of what went on Wednesday night and Thursday morning, was that, amidst the alarms and excursions of the night watches, that it became clear. . . . Dean Platt was sitting in the room too, if my memory serves me. Dean Coleman was there on and off. It became clear that you don't destroy an University for something that is clearly negotiable. Now, I'm not a mad idealist or anything like that, and I was fully aware of the fact that we were bound in by very, very tight contracts to this gym site and to the erection of a building on it, and that there was going to be considerable loss to the University and so on. But, I think that it sort of became crystal clear in people's minds that this would have to be negotiable.

Thursday -- if my ~~memory~~ memory serves me, and this is hard because I did not keep a log and I was too much in the middle of it to be a sort of Madam de Sévigné of the situation -- there was negotiation going on with Hamilton Hall all Wednesday night, into the morning hours on Thursday. There was some discussion with the SDS students in Low Library. The faculty had been upstairs

Prof. Luening from
talking with them. I know that ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ the music department
was making ~~every~~ every effort to reason with them ~~I~~ about the
situation, and I went up and witnessed one of these discussions.
While I felt that the person talking for the administration
was not really acting, in a sense, sympathetic to the situation --
not that he had to agree with SDS or anything like that. . . .

Q: Who was speaking for the administration?

Colahan: I would ~~XXXX~~ prefer not to mention who was speaking for
the administration at this point.

Even so, regardless of his attitude, it was quite clear that
the SDS leadership had already set up preconditions -- amnesty,
absolute settlement of the gym, absolute reneging on the IDA ar-
rangements, ~~all~~ already this thrust for student power in the
government of the University. . . . But amnesty, the gym, and
IDA were sort of the preconditions in their minds and they weren't
going to talk unless this was to happen.

I myself, when I heard the amnesty thing, my immediate
reaction -- not just as an administrator or a good citizen, but
as a logical person -- was that you don't have, no matter how
just one's cause is, that if one does break the rules which have
been duly set and which could have been questioned by whoever
wanted to question them, faculty or students or otherwise, that
you must pay some sort of a price for this.

At any rate, on Thursday, my time was spent mainly over at. . . .

On Thursday morning, at about 10:00, I gave a sort of briefing to the faculty, gathered in 301 Philosophy. They (inaudible) so much talk then. It was a fairly large group by this time, still primarily the group consisted of voting faculty members. I can remember some faces like. . . .

Q: ~~XXXXX~~ What's the difference between voting faculty?

Platt: A voting faculty member of Columbia College is one who has been nominated by his departmental representative of Columbia College to sit as a voter on the Columbia College faculty. He is an assistant professor or above. This is, in a sense, to make sure that you have those who have a real stake, so to speak, in the College, on the faculty and as voters in the faculty. Usually a man is supposed to teach, also, by the stated rules of the faculty, at least one-half of his time in the College; and there are senior members of the faculty who are no longer teaching in the faculty of Columbia College but are in the graduate school, although they now and again come back to Columbia College to teach a course, but who have been primarily identified during their teaching career with the College and they usually stay on as members of the College. All departmental representatives in the College are members of the faculty, the voting faculty, and all chairmen of the University's departments that supply to Columbia College are members of the faculty.

Now, sometime during Thursday, the beginnings of the Ad Hoc Faculty group came into being. This is the group that is sitting over in 301 Philosophy, and they begin to constitute themselves as a group to discuss the situation. They are not clear yet on what they want to do, but what happens is that the constituted organs of the University had not been called into play and there is a faculty sitting here, a lot of faculty members deeply concerned sitting in 301 Philosophy, but they're not getting any leadership from anywhere. I'm attempting to do the best I can to keep them informed but they never get a sense of action taking place and what the central administration is attempting to do. Now, you begin to get coming into the group -- and I think a very important element of what becomes the Ad Hoc Faculty Groups -- sometime in the afternoon of Thursday, the non-tenured personnel, instructors and teaching assistants and preceptors in Columbia College and so on. You also begin to see this group get larger as it takes in people from General Studies--in other words, ceases very shortly to be a Columbia College faculty group, and begins to take in, on Thursday also, people from General Studies faculty, some Engineering faculty, Law faculty members, and so on.

Q: Was this originally a group that had signed a. . . ?

Colahan: No, they had signed nothing at this point in the game. If you back over it, its history is not determined by the great

forces, but it happened to be that on Wednesday morning, as I said, it was raining and, on Wednesday morning, the faculty of Columbia College also was denied its building. On Wednesday morning I arrived at 9:15 or 8:45, and decided that I had no alternative but to take everybody out of the rain, so that we're not discussing history in the rain or what to do next. I'd put them ~~MM~~ someplace where it is dry, so that drier heads can prevail. . . let's put it that way. And that's what we do. We go over to 301 Philosophy.

By Thursday though, because they don't know what the administration ~~XX~~ is doing and the central administration in Low Library is not making clear what it is attempting to do, obviously a faculty of a college or an university is a vocal group and everyone of them is an expert to a greater or lesser extent in his own field. . . . They begin to coalesce into a, at least, talking group and it begins to cease to be, to use a very complicated phrase, simply a Columbia College group with voting faculty and some Columbia College preceptors and so on moving into it, and starts to become a larger group, embracing other schools, with faculty members and non-faculty members, but teaching people, from other schools in the University.

Now it is also on Thursday that this thing begins to have an impact on a wider scale because Mathematics Building is taken. Avery is taken, of the Architecture School, and Fayerweather. These buildings are rather strategic. The ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ mathematics department here is a very articulate, politically conscious department. The Architecture School has been consistently opposed to the architecture being thrown up by the University. And Fayerweather is the home of

the departments that would be most concerned with this matter -- namely history, sociology, economics, and so on. This, then, unhouses, or leaves out in the cold, some more faculty members, who then gravitate toward 301 Philosophy.

So, in 301 Philosophy, by late Thursday afternoon, you begin to get a sense of the meeting type of situation, in the Quaker sense, that we had better do something, we the faculty had better do something. Then they begin to constitute themselves. So, by Thursday evening, you're beginning to get the more formalized structure of a Steering Committee for what becomes the Ad Hoc Faculty Group. The Ad Hoc Faculty Committee is the name that was dreamt up for them.

My role then begins to be formalized into serving as liaison with this group with the central administration in Low Library. The Ad Hoc Faculty ~~X~~ Group starts also, because it doesn't see what the central administration is doing, to enter the process as mediator; and this is a role that it conceives of itself as having from this time out. There are other roles that it picks up, but this is the primary role throughout from Thursday evening let's say, on through until its final dissolution on Monday evening.

So on Thursday, I'm going back and ^{forth} ~~back~~ between these two groups. . . .

Q: What is going on in Low at this time?

Colahan: In Low Library what is going on is that they're trying to various work ~~XXXXXX~~ arrangements, and, as more buildings are occupied, it

becomes obvious that we're faced with a very, very serious situation.

Q: At some point, didn't someone, wonder whether there was something ^{that} was wrong with the security system of the University, that these students had so easily taken. . . ?

Colahan: Oh, yes. The security ~~XX~~ system of the University is essentially a joke. This has always been my premise: the university, operating in a society of law, is one of the most defenseless, and should be. . . short of a hospital, the university should be the other most defenseless institutions in the society. And it is quite clear that those who want to attack it know this too. Our security forces here are minimal, and they just aren't really protecting the place. They are sort of surveilling it and watching it and maintain~~ing~~ some forms of security against theft and some form of security against disorder; but, by and large, they are utterly inadequate to the kind of situation that we find ourselves in at this point. Nor do I remember that this security force that we have was augmented by Pinkertons or anything at this point of the game. Perhaps it would have been wiser at this point to have realized what was going on to have secured the rest of the buildings tight.

In the case of Engineering, for instance, the Dean of Engineering in effect secured his own building, and I think very wisely so. The Dean of General Studies took over his own building and his students ~~XXXXX~~ secured it with him.

The leaders of the, let's call it, SDS and coalition very wisely chose buildings that did not have delicate equipment in them. For instance they could have taken Havemeyer and Chandler, the chemistry buildings, and caused tremendous damage or some of the physics buildings could have been destroyed or stuff in Schermerhorn, the anthroXpoly, psychology, ^{geology building, could} ~~geology building, could~~ have been badly damaged. They wisely took buildings where, by and large, except for the library in Math and the library in Avery plus the professors offices which were invaded and tampered with, there wasn't a tremendous amount of delicate equipment involved.

On Thursday evening something happened which, I think, is important to mention. I was in the Ad Hoc Committee meeting, which now becomes sort of formal, although it is formal in its steering structure. In effect, anybody and everybody is wandering into this meeting throughout. Secretaries were voting. Everybody who felt like it was voting. I was assured by one of my colleagues -- this would have to be confirmed (I can't even remember who said it) but it was a bit of a joke -- that he saw some friends from N. Y. U. voting.

I think that I'll just stop here for a moment and say, throughout this thing, there are people who have two views ~~MA~~ of the Ad Hoc Committee group. There are those who think it was a disaster and should not have been permitted to arise, and there are those who say: Well, look, this was the way that the faculty had to react to this thing. My own personal feeling here is that, in the sort of brilliant glare of hindsight, if it had to be done again, I think

one of the failures -- and I take this as partly my own personal failure, not to see what had to be done -- was that the normal faculty instruments were not used correctly. For instance, I was correct in my judgment in calling a Committee on Instruction meeting for the Wednesday ~~XXXXX~~ morning -- the Committee on Instruction being the faculty-elected governing committee of Columbia College -- and calling the faculty meeting of Columbia College for Wednesday afternoon. But I was not using my head, I think, when I didn't suggest that the Committee on Instruction stay in session continuously and that it be reinforced by six or seven additional faculty members right from the faculty meeting on Wednesday afternoon and that the Columbia College faculty ~~XXX~~ have a special meeting place away from 301 Philosophy. On the other hand, I think that there were failures in the line above me, inasmuch as the University Council, which is the major faculty advisory body to the President, was never called into session to the best of my knowledge. And this is a council with two members elected from the faculty of each school and the dean of each school. I think that this should have been called into play. It would have, again, served as a focal point for organized and recognized faculty concern. It would have given the President a larger advisory body and would have worked within a constitutional framework.

On the other hand, since ~~XXX~~ none of these actions were taken, I think that the Ad Hoc Faculty Group was a good thing, in quotes, because, if you hadn't had them in one place, you would have had them all over the place. And the reasoning which took place in the Ad Hoc

Faculty Group wasn't bad. There was a ^{hell} ~~haz~~ of a lot of rhetoric. A lot of people suddenly saw the phoenix of the 1930's rising and, where they had lost in the past old dreams of Menshevik and Trotskyite, dreams came to the fore and so on and so forth. There is nothing wrong with this. This is healthy if one rejuvenates one's hopes, but, at the same time, throughout, when that faculty group got close to saying, "Okay, give these youngsters amnesty," there was always somebody who said, "But there's a principle of order" -- and not merely the order in the streets thing that we get from our own Federal Government, which I don't think is too bad an idea -- "but, if we do give amnesty, then we condone misrule." And, no matter how late the night might be -- and these meetings went on like scenes in David paintings of the French Revolution or Russian Naturalist paintings of the Moscow Soviet, and I think a lot of people were playing the scene that way -- and no matter what happened, reason always asserted itself and did not give way.

I would answer the critics of the Ad Hoc Faculty Group that, in fact, this was a heroic measure on the part of the faculty, that they were doing what they do best. They were talking out. They were sincerely trying to mediate. . .and that their Steering Committee put on a heroic performance in trying to mediate between the students and the central administration.

And, also, an important thing, if one remembers Berkeley and remembers that, when the Berkeley situation was beginning

momentum, the accession of large numbers of the teaching assistants -- and Berkeley has many more than we have here -- of these, in a sense tenure-excluded people to the student group in opposition to the University, therefore, heated up the Berkeley situation ~~again~~ again. I saw it from a very practical point of view. I thought that as long as you could keep the T. A.'s and the preceptors and the instructors in this room, they were still listening to some people who had more maturity, who could reason things I think a little better, who were not as emotionally upset by things and so on; and you kept them, at least, ~~xxx~~ with the faculty and not with the students in the buildings, which could have been a tragic thing.

I also think that the Ad Hoc Faculty Group did one other thing. I think, that if we go back to your question, What kind of a police force did we have?, we didn't have any. Therefore, the faculty began to serve as a protective unit, in that they maintained order on the campus in effect by their very presence. When we began checking people into the University, they did the checking-in. They made sure that, as things went along and we began to get this very complicated situation of those people occupying the buildings and the opposition on the outside, the student opposition to the people in the buildings, they maintained order. They made sure that people, to the best of their ability, lived up their agreements about food going in and out and all of this stuff, even though SDS continuously changed this agreement and exacerbated the feelings of the faculty on this matter. They did

the best to peace
/keep the ~~KKK~~/as long as they could keep the peace.

This sort of finishes up Thursday. On ~~XXXX~~ Thursday evening, because they felt that they were losing control and order was being lost on the campus, decided that they would call in the police. I think that it was to be a limited show of force, as I understood. The Ad Hoc Faculty Group ran out and put themselves in front of all of the buildings and weren't going to let the police. . . .

Q: Who announced this?

Colahan: The Vice-president and Provost of the University, Dr. Truman, announced it to them.

Q: How did you see the reaction of the faculty?

Colahan: They were terribly upset by it, but, unlike The New Republic article, which is a complete hash in my personal opinion -- and, if I had time to waste on answering it, I would -- they decided to take action, rather than take action on the Provost. There were some cries of, Shame, but the faculty didn't chase him back to Low Library like Rader in The New Republic article implies. The faculty did run out and put themselves in front of all of the buildings, so that the police had to go through them if they were going into the buildings. The University then itself called off the police order.

Also, on Thursday night, which was a rather hectic evening, prior to the show of police, there was a very bad situation where the student ~~opposition~~ opposition to the occupiers of the buildings began to build up ~~and~~ and about 500 of them tried to get into Fayerweather. I participated in trying to stop them. Prof. Melman was quite instrumental, because he has a big, loud voice, in getting people talking. At one point, they nearly got through the north-east side window of Fayerweather, and I ran around there. One boy had his foot in the window, and I got up on the window sill with Prof. Silver. . . Prof. Cumming was in front of me, Prof. Morgenbesser was in front of me under the ledge, down below that window. . . and I made a speech attempting to calm the people who wanted to get in. I have no idea what I said. It was probably as much fantasy as everybody else was saying at that point in the game. Morgenbesser did yeoman service in keeping them talking. Cumming did yeoman ^{service} ~~service~~, while Silver and I tried to talk to the opposition student, from the outside, who was going to go into the Fayerweather Lounge. This was one of the windows into the Lounge. I was half-way into the building, and I can assure you from what I saw there that these people would have been really tore to bits if they had ever gotten into the building because they had no defenses whatsoever. There were alot of girls and young men in there, and it was just a mess. They ~~did~~ didn't know what they were doing. They were running around like ~~chickens~~ chickens with their heads cut off.

Q: The occupiers?

Colahan: The occupiers. They had no defensive system at all at that point in the game. I don't know/^{who}they thought was going to protect them at this point in the game.

Prof. Silver and I talked the student out of the window, and got him down. I don't know. . . Dean Coleman or somebody then. . . . They went over to Wollman, and Dean Coleman talked to them about what was going to happen and so on. I don't know who took over from there, but that was my primary responsibility. But this is before the police showed up, you see. I don't know whether this show of violence, or near violence, was what triggered the central administration to call the police. I wasn't there when that ~~decision~~ decision was made.

It is from the show of police on the campus, I think, if I remember it, that the Ad Hoc Faculty Committee decided that it would, and from the quite clear-cut confrontation that was going to take place between the opposition students and the occupiers of the buildings, in order to prevent violence and to continue. . . . What they were trying to do was to put their bodies on the line in order to continue mediation. So they then took up positions at the doors and they set up a rotating guard system and all of this kind of stuff. You can talk to Prof. Peter Haidu about all of that. I think that he would be able to give you a much clearer sense of how that arrangement worked out. But that was when they really took up positions of protecting the insiders from the outsiders and the outsiders from the insiders and protecting everybody from the police -- not, I think, really on the principle that the police

shouldn't ~~MM~~ come in, but that they wanted to have the option of continuing to try to mediate this thing to a peaceful conclusion.

Q: Can I back you up a minute? Did you hear talk in the central administration of the fear of the reports that there were arms in Hamilton Hall?

Colahan: Yes. There was talk all over the place.

Q: This did reach back to Truman and Kirk?

Colahan: It reached back to Truman and Kirk. Everybody had a sense. . .
? I mean there was considerable talk in Hamilton Hall, in the Ad Hoc Faculty Group that there were arms in Hamilton Hall. Now, how that was laid to rest, I don't remember; but somehow or another. . . I think that the answer to that would probably lay with Prof. Wallerstein, Prof. Silver -- who had been inside Hamilton Hall. . . . Then, later, on Friday, when I was dealing with a student who had been inside Hamilton Hall and began to work out on Friday as iron-clad a guarantee as I could in conjunction with the President for the students in Hamilton Hall with respect to the kind of disciplinary action that would be taken against them, ^{at that point,} plus the gym, it was quite clear that there were no arms in Hamilton Hall at all.

also
How much the arms in Hamilton Hall thing/played in calling the police, I don't know frankly. I think that they were very

loathe

~~XXX~~ to call in the police because, if you have arms inside a building, somebody, sooner or later, is going to use them.

I think that arms in Hamilton Hall rumor was probably current through Thursday night, and it only ~~XXX~~ gets really laid to rest sometime on Friday morning, whoever finally ascertains that it's not so.

Going on through this, I'm going back and forth, in a sort of schizophrenic way, between the Ad Hoc Faculty Group and the people in Low Library; and I remember drafting what I think were the initial terms to the people in Hamilton Hall. I've since lost the piece of paper even that it's on and I'm sorry because I was trying to keep a folder of this stuff. It gave some pretty sound guarantees on the gym.

Q: (Inaudible?)

Colahan: I can't remember what the ^{guarantees} ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ were. I lost the paper at one point.

Q: You can't jog your memory?

Colahan: Well, it's pretty much the terms that the President finally offers them, you see. He goes, at this point, practically to the legal limit to which he can go. There is a straight legal limit on what he can say.

Q: You made this draft ~~for~~ whose benefit?

Colahan: For the President's benefit.

Q: At the request of the President?

Colahan: At the request of the President, right. He is sitting in a room with me and I'm writing it. He is dictating it. I wrote out a model and he fixes it up.

And we also at that point try to straighten out in the same letter, if I remember rightly, that these students will be put on disciplinary warning or something like that.

~~My~~ sense of the reply that we get back on this. . . . A number of these things go into Hamilton Hall and no replies ^{come} ~~come~~ out for quite awhile. It is really only -- I think that this was sent over on Wednesday night and there is dickering going on all through Thursday, both from the Ad Hoc Group and from the President's Office -- on Friday afternoon that you get the sense that these people have got the message in Hamilton Hall, and they're not clear on the disciplinary side. At that point, I spent, on Friday afternoon, all Friday afternoon, with Professors Golding, Silver, and one of Prof. Golding's Negro students, a law student, who was inside Hamilton Hall, but whose name I don't wish to divulge, in precisely defining further the terms on the gym and precisely defining as concretely as possible the terms of discipline. Again, I drafted a thing, which. . . I don't know where it is now. The President may have it over in his office. I don't know where it is. I even, more precisely, if you ~~will~~ will. . . .

But the problem over there was that these students wanted tangible truth, if you will; and I think that we gave them as black-and-white a statement here as we possibly could. . .not to be funny about it.

Q: What were the limitations? They wanted to ~~M~~ make certain, for example, that none of them would be expelled?

Colahan: We said, if I can remember the original letter, that they would be put on disciplinary probation. They worried that this would destroy the Student Afro-American Society. We said that it wouldn't. That was another letter that went back that ~~M~~ same Wednesday night, I believe. Dean Platt can tell you more about this because he was sitting over in Low when that first letter was drafted.

Q: How serious is disciplinary probation?

Colahan: It's un-serious, you see; but the thing about disciplinary probation is, if you are guilty of another infraction of the University's ^{rules} ~~regulations~~, you can be put on suspension for a year or something like that.

Then I can remember on Friday, writing in conjunction with Prof. Silver, Golding, and this law student of Golding's, giving even more precision to these terms, getting a better definition. In fact, Platt then decided, if my memory serves me, that we would put them on disciplinary warning, which is a little less than

disciplinary probation. In other words, I guess the order of severity would be disciplinary warning. If you then do something wrong you would go on disciplinary probation. And if you then do something wrong you go on suspension. If you do something wrong after that, ^{then} ~~they~~ you would probably be expelled.

Anyway, it is Friday that we finally ~~hammer~~ out what I think is the final document in this thing, and we don't hear anything more about it, the rumor being, though, that they understand full well now that, at least on the disciplinary side, their student group and they aren't going to be destroyed by what they've done. I'm still not sure that they really believed what was being said about the Park, although I firmly believe, in my personal opinion, that the President meant exactly what he said--namely, that he would recommend favorably to the Trustees that construction be stopped on the gym, that the matter be reconsidered, that it be discussed with the community leaders, the faculty, students, and so on, and that then, in the light of that reconsideration the Trustees would come to a decision. But, he was obviously bound legally by the fact that he can't commit his Trustees.
~~That's all~~ That's all there is to this. This has been a sticking point with everybody.

Q: He could have gone a step further though, and said that he would recommend to the Trustees that they abandon that.

Colahan: That was where he felt that he could not do that. As I remember it, he felt that he could recommend favorably that the whole matter be reconsidered. Now, that carries considerable weight. He's a man on the spot, the Trustees are aware of that, and they know that he must have made this favorable recommendation for reconsideration for some very sound reasons. I think that he went up to the limit. I think that, finally, when you get the final formulation of the thing in the Galanter-Hovde-Trilling Committee Report, that that's as far as the President could possibly go legally, without acting completely beyond the charge given him by the Trustees in this matter.

On Friday, the Ad Hoc Committee gets into full swing. It appoints a Steering Committee of Westin, Dallin, I've forgotten who else. Wallerstein takes over ~~Ek~~ for them, the Ad Hoc Committee Group, as a negotiator for Hamilton Hall, and Professors Rothman, Silver, and Westin take up negotiating with the remainder of the occupiers of the buildings. The sum and substance from there on out of what went on in the Ad Hoc Committee meetings was--I've forgotten which night it was. I think that it might have been Friday night, although it might just as well have been Thursday night. It is the night after Rothman, Westin, and Silver come back.

No. . .let me back-track a bit. Thursday night, if my memory serves me, is the night when all of the student groups come in to present their case to the Ad Hoc Committee, and this goes on from about 8:00 in the evening until the first alarms and excursions

come at about 11:00 or 12:00. Mr. Rudd from SDS presented his case. He had, as his supporters, Juan Gonzalez from the Citizenship Council and a non-student of Columbia College, David Gilbert. Gilbert is an ^{alumnus} ~~XXXXXX~~ of the College, but no longer a student in this University.

Q: He is aligned with SDS?

Colahan: With SDS, right.

Rudd gave a straight: These are our demands, so on and so forth; and he was asked only two questions. One was a question that I asked him, that he claimed that there were no lines of communication and means of legitimate change under the present structure; and I asked him if he had ever tried to use the means that were available, because there ~~IX~~ are clear-cut cases of delivery for change by using the Committee on Instruction of Columbia College, placing anything before that committee, sending it in to the Columbia College faculty to the University Council. If it recommends it favorably to the President and, if the President can act on it alone, he acts on it alone. If it has to be acted on, it goes to the Trustees. The two cases in question do have political overtones to them, and there has been action taken. . .namely, the one case was the case of the rank in class being given to Selective Service Boards, which has (inaudible) precedence in Columbia College's Committee on Instruction on request from the faculty, goes all the way up to the Trustees, and is acted on swiftly and the

says Trustees say, "There will be no class rank computed." The same thing goes with the question of IDA, outside agencies recruiting on campus. It starts out as a request from a faculty group that this be considered. The Committee on Instruction of Columbia College sets up the Silver Committee to examine it. That Committee reports to the Committee on Instruction. The Committee on Instruction sends a report up to the faculty of Columbia College. The faculty of Columbia College recommends it favorably to the President. The President refers it to the University Council. The University Council gives its okay, says to the President that they think it should be looked into, and the President sets up the Henkin Committee which will report probably before the end of this year or probably at the beginning of next year. So, in fact, delivery has taken place. Political action even can be taken through these devices. Mr. Rudd dismisses this as irrelevant.

Then there was another question, which I think would be most important, if you discuss this with Prof. Silver, that you have him phrase the question that he asked, because what he really asked Rudd was a question that Rudd could not answer. As I remember the question, it was: No matter whether the SDS accepts the present code of responsibility in this society and this University or ~~NOEM~~ whether it accepts its own code, does it accept responsibility for its actions, under some code? This was the one that they could not ~~XXX~~ answer at all, and asked that they be permitted to leave the meeting to think up an answer. This annoyed them very much because it wasn't in the catechism[?]

set of replies that we were getting and in the rhetoric that they were using.

I don't know whether it is late Thursday night. . . . I think it is late Friday night. Yes, it is Friday night, when the SDS. . . . When Professors Silver, Westin, and Rothman return from negotiating with Mr. Rudd and the Steering Committee, whatever you call the first Strike Steering Committee. . . they come back and what's been going on with the white student Steering Committee, if you will -- the occupiers of Low, Mathematics, Avery, Fayerweather -- is what I call the yo-yoing technique. Namely, they lead the Steering Committee. . . the negotiating committee into thinking that they are getting somewhere and ^{then} ~~they~~ they say: Oh, no. We changed the demands. We changed the wording. We do this, that, and the other. It's a legitimate technique but they're not acting with what I would call good faith. I mean, once something is agreed to, it's been hashed out, it should be accepted and you go on to the next step. Instead, there's a two-steps-forward five-steps-backward routine going on. They are playing the Ad Hoc Committee.

And I think on Friday night, after the mediators ^{come} ~~come~~ back, Westin reports that it looks like there is some progress. A few minutes after Westin reports, Rudd comes in and asks to speak to the meeting. This is the famous speech where Rudd says roughly (I paraphrase here, and there's only one word that counts in this whole thing): It's pleasant talking to these gentlemen. And Westin and Silver and Rothman are sitting there before the Ad Hoc Committee. We know that you're nice fellows, but

? ?
 the fact is that this is bull\$hit. That's about it, and unless
 you guys are ready to collapse all the way, forget it. Rudd did
 this because, at that time of the night, at about 1:00 on Fri-
 day morning, the ^{Ad Hoc} Committee was. . . by that time, the over-thirties
 had gone home to bed and the young folks of American were there
 in force, the young instructors and so on, and they were getting
 ready to vote amnesty I think. It was a very bad political move
 on Rudd's part, because there was a gasp in the crowd when he
 said that this was bull-shit, these tremendous efforts. People
 were exhausted, and they had been up for hours. It was a clear
 slap in the face, and he thought that he was going to collapse
 them by saying what you are doing is fruitless and futile.
 But, in effect, that broke it up right there. At that point, Prof.
 Westin got up and called the meeting adjourned and was very red
 in the face about what was going on. He was very, very upset about
 it. This was probably one of the greatest blunders that Rudd
 ever made throughout the thing and, I think, is one of the things
 that is indelibly etched in people's memories.

On Saturday. . . Saturday and Sunday seem to sort of mesh in
~~XX~~ my mind. There was alot of talking going on back and forth;
 but by this time, people are beginning to see that, in fact, they're
 getting nowhere with the SDS'ers and the occupiers of the buildings.
 There is continuous talk about different grades of committment
 in the buildings. Fayerweather was the most idealistic, ^{least} ~~XXXX~~ cadre-
 organized building. Avery was way up in the clouds because this
 was ~~XXXXX~~ the architectural group that was going to change the

world. Mathematics was a mainly ~~XXXX~~ Maoist- Castroite group, which I happen to think that it was. I went over and watched them very carefully. It was a much more extreme performance than anything going on in Avery or Fayerweather. The occupiers of Low had a floating population, but it was mainly SDS. It's very hard of course to enter into the. . . ~~XXXX~~ ^{I'm} going on second-hand things, but I did talk at considerable length with one of my own students, who was in Fayerweather for most of the time, and I get a sense that the Fayerweather people were the most hip of these groups. . . namely, they considered this a "beautiful" thing and so on and so forth. I think that the flags over, say, Fayerweather and Avery, should not have been red, but black. . . namely the flags of anarchy, or sweet anarchy, philosophic ~~XX~~ anarchy.

What was happening though was that the SDS people were very annoyed that anybody was trying to talk to the other buildings. ~~XXXX~~ Their rules were to be ~~XXXX~~ enforced and, while they could talk to the administration and say one thing to the administration and one thing to the Ad Hoc Faculty Group, that ~~either~~ group, that is the administration or the faculty, was to be permitted to talk to any of their people. In other words, my tactics are okay, but your tactics are wrong.

The group in Fayerweather, it has always been claimed, were ready to somewhat give in and come out of the buildings. Well, obviously, the administration position as I understood it and as I was conveying it was: If you want to walk out of the buildings, walk out of them. Whether we could all be there to take your names, I don't know. Again, it was the old story that it would be abit

of a joke, because there weren't that many people available to take names. And I do think, probably, that the Fayerweather people were closest to reason and did understand that in fact the administration, particularly in the last set of the Galanter-Hovde-Trilling arrangements. . .were superb, because they got everything that they wanted, with the exception of amnesty, which neither Galanter, Hovde, or Trilling was prepared to offer either.

But, I think that what came into force here, after all of the political theorizing with, I think, Avery and Fayerweather was, in fact, that you had adolescent I'm-not-going-to-let-the-side-down take over. They were ashamed to do what an older person would do. Namely: On rational grounds, I can no longer go along with you. You want to go on. I'm telling you that I'm leaving. I'm just going to walk out and leave you cold. I'm pulling out and you've got to understand why I'm pulling out.

What happens with the Ad Hoc Faculty group, though, throughout, by Saturday, Sunday, Monday, is that it becomes very apparent that the leadership of the buildings -- and I don't know who is really in control of the Steering Committee, but I've got a very strong suspicion that the hard-core cadre types were in control and were filtering information into the buildings. And it became apparent too that many of the buildings weren't getting the score as it was coming out of either the administration or the Ad Hoc Faculty Committee -- just wasn't going to budge, and they wanted confrontation. This is a personal opinion that I happen

to feel very strongly on. All of the evidence ~~MMX~~ that I've seen. . . that, in fact, what SDS wanted ~~was~~ quite simply was confrontation with the police. This is implicit in all acts that they undertook. This is, of course, in their sense winning, because they are showing the corruptness of the society they are dealing with.

So, as you went on with the Ad Hoc Faculty Group, I think that more and more people realized this. Now, the problem here is that it is one thing to realize it, that you're going to have to call in the police sooner or later, and another thing to physically face the act. I think in the administration, the administration always had to consider that. It would be remiss if it didn't have before it, one of those options being the calling in of the police. What happens ~~XX~~ is that, in fact, things begin to just peter down; and you get to sometime on Monday afternoon, I guess, when, I think, even those in the Ad Hoc Faculty Group realize that we either just close the place down or we call in the police. There were very few options left here. What happens then, of course, is that the police are eventually called in. . . .

Q: Were you at any of the discussions with the central administration?

Colahan: No, I was not during any of that time. During most of Sunday and Monday, I was over in Fayerweather. . . rather, over in Philosophy and reporting back as I went along.

And I had to report back, I must be honest, that in fact once the Galanter proposals were not accepted by the students in the buildings, it was pretty much: What do we do next? Nobody

had much of anyplace else to go. After the fact, I've heard alot of people say, Yes, we could have done this, that, and the other. But I was there and I know that it was a pretty hopeless situation.

I think that the arrival of Prof. Bell from Chicago, I believe on Friday, did bring new life to it for awhile, because all of us were so entwined in the situation that, in fact, he was helpful in bringing some new light into this. But, by and large, by, say, Sunday afternoon, things ~~had~~ had been talked out; and I think that I must be completely honest, when I say that finally, I had to report into Low Library that there were no options left open. People were exhausted. Low Library then took whatever. . . . The men in Low Library took their decision and then they went into action.

I witnessed considerable of the police action in various places. I don't think that the police were overly brutal. I mean, as one who has seen the police in action in other places and has had some training in riot control myself, when I was in the Army, I think it was a very efficient action. That's an unpleasant term to have to use, but it was a very effecient action in all of the buildings. I think that ~~MM~~ where the trouble came was when the police then lined up and charged the South Field people. I think that that was the unnecessary action; but, by ~~the~~ time, tempers were high on both sides.

The problem here is that the Americans have not seen, and thank heavens they don't have to see too often, force of this kind used. It's terribly shocking to a people who are not used to seeing

anything like this. In the aftermath of the action, on Monday morning, I went home at about 3:00 or 4:00, whenever it was, just exhausted; but I listened to WKCR and it was quite clear that the people then in Ferris Booth Hall were without any leadership, without any adult being with them.

So I decided that I would go back over to Ferris Booth Hall, take my chances on being thrown out, but to go over and assert the fact that at least an adult was concerned with them. I stayed in Ferris Booth Hall for about an hour, wandering around, talking with them. They were in shock, but myself and Dean Platt were the only adults in the place and we did what we could to help them. I went over to 301 Philosophy, ^{which} ~~XXXXXX~~ was an aid station, talked with some of our own teachers, instructors who were in shock. I sent some people home who obviously were close to the end. That was the end of the action for me.

Q: A couple more questions. . .do you recall any of the things considered by the central administration and discarded?

Colahan: Well, I think that they were working primarily around. . . . I think, as the tape will make evident, their first aim was to negotiate with the ~~XXXXXX~~ people in Hamilton Hall, because obviously with the people in Ham~~il~~ton Hall, if they were not handled wisely, and this is just a realistic estimate, it could have brought all of Harlem down on us. So that had to be handled first.

As far as handling the other students goes, I think that they felt that, if they could work from the options worked out with

Hamilton Hall, they could work back to the other students; but, since the amnesty thing was always a precondition, I think that probably many men's minds were probably turned off by that.

That's about it.

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

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