Imperium Mundi

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Summary of Master’s Thesis

According to the current state of the social scientific knowledge macro-social processes are considered to be contingent and, in the long run, unpredictable. Spengler’s Morphology of World-History was, on the contrary, contrived as a model for social and cultural prognostication based on non-causal symbolic patterns whose existence is presupposed alongside causal constellations of events. The cognition of these non-causal symbolic correlations should provide insight behind historical contingencies. Whereas causalities and contingencies are researched by means of empirical observation and analytical theorization, non-causal symbolic coherencies are cognized through intuitive insights and generalizations. Communication between analytic and intuitive paradigms is facilitated by the fact that many analytical models contain intuitive core knowledge irreducible to evidences which could be secured empirically. Thus, Spengler’s epistemology may be viewed as a more intuitive approach in comparison with epistemologies allowed by established scientific codes. In the Master’s Thesis intuition is defined as cognizing imagination transcending average perception. In order to mediate between rational and intuitive paradigms the theory of culture organisms - a heuristic tool of Spengler’s intuitive cognition - is juxtaposed with certain models borrowed from biosemiotics, transpersonal psychology and systems theory. Definition elaborated as a result of the analysis describes cultures as transpersonal psychological and organic systems. By means of morphological comparison a common historical timeline inherent in this type of systems is extrapolated to the current and future developments. The organically predetermined historical phases serve as a framework for prognostication of social and political dynamics. The below paper – composed to the large extent as an array of quotations from Spengler’s works and supporting contemporary sources - presents a scenario of transformation of the Occidental societies as a transition from democracy to a post-democratic order in the wake of intercivilizaional struggle for global dominance.
At the age of 19 I put up […] an army with whose assistance I rescued the oppressed State from the violent power of one party and led it into freedom… The Senate appointed me a commander-in-chief of the army and told me to care for the State so that no harm would be done to it. The People elected me the same year so that I should arrange State in proper order.

Octavian Augustus

Spengler’s political resistance to the Weimar Republic as well conservative tone of his political writings pose a temptation to subsume his entire social philosophy into an antidemocratic strain of thought. However, ideological attributions based on binary differentiations such as democratic versus authoritarian, progressive versus conservative, liberal versus reactionary or left versus right do not embrace the scope of Spengler’s ideas which should be considered beyond the categories of left and right. Spengler was convinced that political game “remains the same in all late and mature cultures of the world (…): on the left there is higher intelligence, often insecure because of the lack of practical tradition; on the right there is ‘ethos’ as well as administrative and diplomatic experience which, however, are destined to failure for the lack of intelligence”. (Spengler 1924:15; translation mine) Spengler did not oppose democracy per se but rather its Weimar manifestation. He not only made concrete proposals in order to enhance social mobility and consolidate conservative democratic order in Germany but also quite unequivocally expressed his theoretical position. In “Prussianism and Socialism” Spengler asserted:

“Democracy is the form of this century - no matter how one might estimate it - which will prevail. For the state there is either democratization or nothing”. (Spengler 1920:98; translation mine)

On closer examination of Spengler’s political concept democracy turns out to be, on the one hand, a necessary phase in the organic process of history – the “Destiny” – and, on the other hand, an ideological utopia. Spengler saw a utopian aspect of democracy in a belief that people as a collective sovereign would rule the state through the medium of a constitution, legislative and executive branches of power which together represent the sovereign’s will. Moreover, Spengler considered utopian the very idea that a mass of voters would make competent decisions and that media would provide unbiased information for such decision to be made. In reality, democracy functions not as popular rule but as a mechanism of the elite selection:

“If the ‘liberty of princes’ at the great turn of the 18th to 19th centuries had to be replaced by the freedom of nations then it made sense only insofar as selection of ruling individuals would become better, their methods more successful and their achievements greater” (Spengler 1924:20; translation mine)
In this system of governance a democratic utopia is an indispensable cover-up for democratic reality. The inherited consensus of pre-modern societies had to be substituted for ideologies as a new form of public consensus at the outset of the decline when both estates – nobility and clergy which in growing culture organisms symbolize active and contemplative dimensions of life – had become inorganic:

“For the culture is a plant. The more perfectly a nation represents the Culture (…), the more abundant the arrangement of its stature is according to Estates and ranks, with awesome distances from the deeply rooted peasantry and all the way upwards to the ruling groups of an urban society. (…) But as soon as this form of life ceases to be self-evident, as soon as it begins to even take notice of criticism with regard to its necessity, it is finished. (…) The more prominent a Culture is, the more it is similar to a composition of a noble body of an animal or a plant, the greater differences are between its constituting elements -- differences and not polarities…” (Spengler 1933:68ff; translation mine)

Since the necessity of democratization results from the dissolution of primordial forms of the public consensus new forms of consensus must be be intentionally produced and reproduced. For Spengler democratization is a sign of transition from Culture to Civilization - the actual decline - , which is a “phase of several centuries” (Spengler 1918:XV) at whose beginning Spengler believed to see the West in 1912. The “Third Estate” that Spengler designates the “Non-Estate” (Spengler 1922:334, 396), displaces both estates of culture and manufactures consensus of civilization where economy constitutes a symbol of an active dimension and science symbolizes reflexive dimension. Money and knowledge become inherent symbolic forms of civilization whose political form - including parties and journalism controlled by economic powers - culminates in democracy:

“It is, for the Classical rhetoric, and for the Western journalism, both serving that abstract which represents the power of Civilization – money. It is the money-spirit which penetrates unremarked the historical forms of the people’s existence…”. (Spengler 1918:34f)

„Money has become, for man as an economic animal, a form of the activity of waking-consciousness, having no longer any roots in Being. This is the basis of its monstrous power over every beginning Civilization, which is always an unconditional dictatorship of money, though taking different forms in different Cultures”. (Spengler 1922:98)

The manufacturing of a new consensus commences with the construction of the “people” in whose name the bourgeoisie first justifies its “rebellion against the – ‘feudal’ – powers of blood and tradition” and after the victory and abandonment of the estate order legitimizes its power by means of parliamentarism, that Spengler understands as a “method through which a newspaper reader is being brought up to believe that he – in the mass – is sovereign”. (Spengler as cited in Felken 1988:37; translation mine) Once manufactured, the “sovereign” is being continuously reproduced through ideologies, media, political parties and other democratic institutions. Press freedom and freedom of opinion are insofar a precondition for a democratic form of government as the latter is based on the “preparation of public opinion” by the press. (Spengler 1922:401f) The press, Spengler claimed, „does not spread ,free’ opinion – it generates it“. (Spengler
Manipulation of mass psychology is inherent in democracy not as its negative byproduct but as its very essence. The controlled democracies of the present are just a next step in the development of “authentic” democratization of the 19th and 20th centuries attuned to becoming an effective technique that enables leading democratic nations to reach both domestic and foreign policy objectives formulated by the ruling minorities. As Ian Traynor from London Guradian points out, „the operation – engineering democracy through the ballot box and civil disobedience – is now so slick that the methods have matured into a template for winning other people’s elections.” (Engdahl 2009: 31) From a technical point of view manipulation of the public opinion comes from the tension between a publically embraced ideal of the popular sovereignty and a lack of competencies in the population that are needed in order to master the complexities of modern politics. For voters do not act as politicians but as consumers of political services. This is why in stable democracies the real function of the “sovereign” is to legitimize the authority of the elite groups. The political elite reproduces itself through party organizations and secures control over democratic institutions by organizing election campaigns with a limited range of discussable issues. This makes it possible for the ruling minority to successfully avoid any serious challenges to the continuity of political course that would emerge if citizens uncontrollably exercised their constitutional rights. But upon the “upspringing of formless powers” of populism, which Spengler designates “from its most conspicuous example, Napoleonism” (Spengler: 1922:404), democratic stabilization of the society turns out to be only a provisional phase between an aristocratic and a so called “caesarean” stages of development. Thus, “caesarism” constitutes an inevitable consequence of the progressing crisis of consensus and legitimacy reproduction:

“…Parliamentarism is not a summit as the absolute Polis and the Baroque States were summits, but a brief transition – namely, between the Late-Culture period with its mature forms and the age of great individuals in a formless world. (…) With the beginning of the twentieth century Parliamentarism (…) is tending rapidly towards taking up itself the role that it once assigned to the kingship. It is becoming an impressive spectacle for the multitude of the Orthodox, while the center of gravity of big policy, already de jure transferred from the Crown to the people’s representatives, is passing de facto from the latter to unofficial groups and the will of unofficial personages”. (Spengler 1922:416)

Spengler describes “caesarism” as the “kind of government which, irrespective of any constitutional formulation that it may have, is in its inward self a return to thorough formlessness. (…) Real importance centered in the wholly personal power exercised by the Caesar, or by anybody else capable of exercising it in his place”. (Spengler 1922:431) Post-democracy is a specifically Western version of “the transition from Napoleonism to Casarism” perceived as “a general phase of evolution, which occupies at least two centuries and can be shown to exist in all the Cultures”. According to Spengler in the West a caesarian age is due to take the period between 2000 and 2200. This process begins with a decrease of a society’s ability to organize itself. The “Third estate” becomes the “Forth estate” – an atomized majority whose actions are determined by solely private imperatives. The old nations are replaced by cosmopolitan, post-heroic and de-ideologized populations that increasingly elude active involvement into the democratic process. Old elites lose their symbolic potential to shape the society and become
reduced to clans struggling for power. These feuds are nothing else than a political manifestation of an overall craving for private gains:

“The nation as a society, which was originally an organic network of families, is threatened to be dissolved by an urban influence into a number of private atoms every of which desires to gain the biggest possible amount of pleasure – panem at circenses - from his own life as well as from the lives of others”. (Spengler 1933:172; translation mine)

„All great political questions are solved, as they are solved sooner or later in every Civilization, inasmuch as questions are no longer felt as questions and are not asked”. (Spengler 1922:50)

“…There are no more political problems. People manage with the situation as it is and the powers that be. (...) Torrents of blood had reddened the pavements of all world-cities, so that the great truths of Democracy might be turned into actualities, and for the winning of rights without which life seemed not worth the living. Now these rights are won, but the grandchildren cannot be moved, even by punishment, to make use of them. A hundred years more, and even the historians will no longer understand the old controversies”. (Spengler 1922: 432)

“All that remains is the struggle for mere power, for animal advantage per se. Whereas previously power, even when to all appearance destitute of any inspiration, was always serving the Idea somehow or other, in the late Civilization even the most convincing illusion of an idea is only the mask for purely zoological strivings”. (Spengler 1922:49)

Inasmuch as democratic nations turn into ochlocratic populations they lose their emancipatory dynamic and end up in an identity crisis. In Bernhard Giesen’s opinion a “democratic nation can exist (…) only as a movement that embraces and emancipates more and more groups, that finds the existing reality wrong and tries to overcome it. As soon as this movement comes to a halt or loses a path, democratic coding enters a volatile terrain: it loses its expansive direction and drains away in the present”. (Giesen 1993:195; translation mine) The results of the public opinion polls conducted in Germany seem to corroborate the stagnation scenario. According to Spiegel only 12 percent of the population are “very much satisfied” with German democracy. “Only 31 percent are still positive about the socially oriented market economy. Thus both pillars of the German social order have become crumbly”, admits Ralf Neukirch (2008; translation mine) from Spiegel. And yet this dissatisfaction does not trigger movements of a mass protest that would match the early democratic age, especially not in the German youth who would rather adapt to the existing situation than attempt to change it through political means. The poll conducted by Spiegel among the 20 to 35-year olds shows a generation of disillusioned pragmatists though they are not destitute of messianic hopes:

“They are apolitical. If they are told this, 83 percent of them (…) do not even perceive it as an offence. They are not interested in the democracy of political parties and the last thing that would come to their minds is to revolutionize the society. In the 2005 parliamentary elections especially many of the 18 - 35-year olds stayed away from the polls. (…) They do not feel aversion to politics but they simply have no idea of why they should deal with things that have nothing to do with their lives. (…) However, they think Barack Obama is alright and that he should save the
world and the climate, too. 31 percent believe that he can change the world for the better ‘much’ or even ‘very much’, 59 percent believe – ‘a little’” (Titz, Mersch 2009; translation mine)

Without democratic ethos in the population democratic institutions lose their stabilizing and disciplining effect. The erosion of symbolic codes of democracy provides space for dynamic and creative individual politicians. According to Spengler, the ruler of the future is a private person, “who will have power at any price, and who as a phenomenon of force becomes the Destiny of an entire people or Culture”. (Spengler 1922:418) In this sense it is possible to interpret the Obama-mania of 2009 as a first symptom of the dawning caesarian age. The Obama phenomenon, at least as Garbor Steingart (2009) describes it, is consistent with the Spengler’s forecast:

“What despots like Mao, Lenin and Stalin claimed to be, namely the teachers of their peoples, Obama really is. (…) It rarely happened in a democratic society that power, both real and cultural, would to such an extent be concentrated in one person”. (translation mine)

Alongside the atomization and privatization of the public this effect is generated by deep changes in the landscape of political parties. Parties have been converting from pools of activists and ideologists to de facto PR-agencies and private headquarters of the political leadership. This metamorphosis, predicted by Spengler, is caused by the weakening of creativity and competence in the elites that are no longer able to shape political process:

“The form of the governing minority develops steadily from that of the Estates, through that of the Party, towards that of the Individual’s following. (…) An Estate has instincts, a party has a program, but a following has a master. (…) A tendency that has organized itself in the people, has already ipso facto become the tool of the organization, and continues steadily along the same path until the organization also becomes in turn the tool of the leader. (…) In the beginning the leading and the apparatus come into existence for the sake of the program. Then they are held on to defensively by their incumbents for the sake of power and booty… (…) Lastly the program vanishes from memory, and the organization works for its own sake alone”. (Spengler 1922:452)

At the top of the Western democratic pyramid – the United States – this already seems to be the case. With regard to the 2008 Presidential elections, for example, the progressive thinker Noam Chomsky (2008) said in the interview for Spiegel about the Republican candidate McCain:

“In one aspect he is more honest than his opponent. He explicitly states that this election is not about issues but about personalities. The Democrats are not quite as honest even though they see it the same way. (…) The United States has essentially a one-party system and the ruling party is the business party.”

The same trend can be observed in the Old World. The British historian Timothy Garton Ash (2009) quite precisely characterizes the situation in which political parties find themselves in Great Britain and Germany:

“David Cameron's Conservatives are taking (former Prime Minister) Tony Blair's approach, except when it comes to European policy. And there is no decisive difference between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats in Germany, at least not by the standards of the
last century. (…) Our governments are behaving more and more like managers. After 10 years, voters are dissatisfied with the current management, and along comes a new one”.

It is individual politicians and not political programs that are to the fore of the political management and its communication to the voter. Analyzing election campaigns of his party – Christian Democrats - the former Interior Minister of Germany Wolfgang Schäuble (2008) also admits progressing personification of the election strategy:

“The thinking in terms of party wings is obsolete. Earlier we used to run our election campaigns as a team, today we’re focusing on one individual” (translation mine)

Beside the blockade through political parties and mainstream media the popular sovereignty is, in its utopian version, undermined by the hierarchization of the nation states and accordingly, the nation elites within the system of global interdependence termed by Spengler as Imperium mundi:

“We have entered the age of the world wars. It begins in the nineteenth century and will continue throughout this and perhaps the next century. It means a transition from the 18th century world of states into the Imperium mundi. (…) The imperialism is an idea, no matter if its bearers and facilitators become aware of it or not. In our case it will probably never be fully implemented - it will possibly be thwarted by other ideas that emerge outside the world of white peoples – but as a tendency of a great historical form it is present in everything that is currently being done”. (Spengler 1933:17; translation mine)

Spengler predicted the organic development of the West towards the world order as well as a struggle between main actors for predominance in this globalized world. He ruled out the very possibility of a peaceful integration of different world regions or a pure economic competition without a military option. Neither can ambitions of competing powers be confined to a home region of a respective culture. In Spengler’s opinion imperialism is a “necessary … product of any Civilization”. (Spengler 1922:422) The global order will be fought out through wars whose psychologically important but practically irrelevant byproduct is pacifism:

“In these wars … for the heritage of the whole world, continents will be staked, India, China, South Africa, Russia, Islam called out, new technics and tactics played and counterplayed. The great cosmopolitan foci of power will dispose at their pleasure of smaller states – their territory, their economy and men alike… (…) Again and again between these catastrophes of blood and terror the cry rises up for reconciliation of the peoples and for peace on earth. It is but the background and the echo of the grand happening…” (Spengler 1922:429)

Economy and communication constitute the main aspects of today’s globalization narratives whereas the issue of military and political predominance as a precondition of global processes is marginalized. An alternative narrative reconstructing the history of globalization on Spengler’s model would, on the contrary, focus on the conflict between the superpowers and the victory of the one of them. Such a narrative would probably begin with the year 1939 when the War & Peace Studies Project was developed by the New York Council on Foreign Relations whose participants made an important contribution to the designing of the postwar world order. In
William Engdahl’s opinion, “their strategy had been to create a kind of informal empire, one in which America would emerge as the unchallenged hegemonic power in a new world order to be administered through the newly-created United Nations Organization”. (Engdahl 2009:11)

The realpolitik thinking underlying this scheme is sufficiently exemplified by a declassified memo which the Director of the Policy Planning Staff George F. Kennan (1948) drafted at the beginning of the Cold War:

„Furthermore, we have about 50% of the world's wealth but only 6.3% of its population. (...) In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of altruism and world-benefaction.”

The understanding of the new geopolitical dominance structure, which in its current form can effectively function only as a well-balanced constellation of soft power and hard power, requires sensibility to its dual terminology. It is necessary to distinguish between more or less internal terms such as “imperial geo-strategy”, “primacy”, “supremacy”, “hegemony” (Brzezinski 1997) the World War III and World War IV (Woolsey 2002) and their fungible public equivalents like “stability”, “international leadership”, “free world”, “globalization”, “international community” etc. The bipolar world that emerged as a result of the US, British and Soviet victory over Germany and its allies in the World War II relativized the sovereignty of the bloc states of both remaining superpowers. However, the countries of the Pax Americana enjoyed greater freedom in their foreign policy decisions than the satellite states of the Soviet Empire. This autonomy might at times have generated an illusion of real sovereignty as demonstrated by the debates in West Germany in the mid-1980s between the Green Party and the Social Democrats on one side and the Christian Democrats on the other, regarding the necessity of additional nuclear armament. The argument between the opponents – writes Martin Vogt - was so fierce “as if the decision could have been made in the Federal Republic of Germany irrespective of the policy of the allies and the relationship between the West and the East Block. But in reality, until 1990 the upgrading of the missile arsenal as well as disarmament issues were determined solely by the relationship between both superpowers the USA and the USSR and its outcome for the NATO and the Warsaw Pact systems”. (Vogt 2006: p.903; translation mine) The US victory in the Cold War, sealed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, opened the way for conversion of the Pax Americana into the Imperium mundi. According to the Washington Post report from 11.3.1992 a supporting strategy plan was drafted under the guidance of the US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz:

„In a classified blueprint intended to help ,set the nation’s direction for the next century’, the Defense Department calls for concerted efforts to preserve American global military supremacy and to thwart the emergence of a rival superpower in Europe, Asia or the former Soviet Union… [T]he document argues not only for preserving but expanding the most demanding American commitments and for resisting efforts by key allies to provide their own security.
The central strategy of the Pentagon framework is to ‘establish and protect a new order’ that accounts ‘sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership’, while at the same time maintaining a military dominance capable of ‘detering potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.’” (As cited in Engdahl 2009: pp.199f)

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the US strategist and foreign policy adviser to the candidate Barack Obama, sketched out five years after the Wolfowitz’ plan the priorities of the US foreign policy much on the same lines:

“In brief, for the United States, Eurasian geo-strategy involves the purposeful management of geo-strategically dynamic states… To put it in a terminology that harkens back to the more brutal age of ancient empires, the three grand imperatives of imperial geo-strategy are to prevent collusion and to maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together.” (Brzezinski 1997: p.39)

“Eurasia is the world’s axial super-continent. A power that dominated Eurasia would exercise decisive influence over two of the world’s three most economically productive regions, Western Europe and East Asia. A glance at the map also suggests that a country dominant in Eurasia would almost automatically control the Middle East and Africa. With Eurasia now serving as the decisive geopolitical chessboard, it no longer suffices to fashion one policy for Europe and another for Asia. What happens with the distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass will be of decisive importance to America’s global primacy”. (Brzezinski Sept./Oct. 1997)

At the age of caesarism the guiding liberal and democratic principles of separation of powers within a nation state, independence of media, international balances of power, separation of civil and military authorities as well as intactness of an individual’s privacy become relativized. These are the first signs of the constitution of “formless populations (...) as an Imperium of gradually-increasing crudity of despotism” (Spengler 1918: Table III.) predicted by Spengler. These changes have been lately attested by some people of expertise like, for example, Ray McGovern (2009) the former CIA analyst and advisor to the Presidents Reagan and G. Bush Senior who in an interview for The Real News Network described a new trend in the relationship between the US elected authorities and the intelligence establishment:

“For the last eight years, the Constitution has been sort of in abeyance with the willing acknowledgment and acquiescence of the legislative branch, which we used to call the Congress of the United States. (...) There are reports that some of the torture is continuing in places like Bagram, in places like Guantánamo with these goon squads. (...) I think the president is afraid of the CIA. I think Leon Panetta is afraid of the CIA. (...) They have been either co-opted or they're afraid, and that's new. I've never seen that in my 46 years in this city, where the chief executive and the head of the CIA is afraid.”

The concentration of power within small groups of influence in dominating states, consolidation of geostrategic relations beyond proclaimed sovereignty of allied states, more open use of practices that are not supported by moral or legal conventions, self-censorship of the mainstream media as well as application of new strategies to manipulate public opinion can be interpreted as
attributes of an emerging post-democratic order. However, the decisive shift of social and political potencies towards Caesarism occurs only at the point of militarization of the society and political involvement of the military and intelligence community. In Spengler’s words,

“The place of the permanent armies as we know them will gradually be taken by professional forces of volunteer war-keen soldiers; and from millions we shall revert to hundreds of thousands. But *ipso facto* this second century will be one of actually Contending States.”

(Spengler 1922:429)

“…For the armies will replace the parties…” (Spengler 1933:153; translation mine)

This forecast might be materializing nowadays in form of a private security company that Jeremy Scahill poignantly characterized in the title of his book *Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army*. This new non-state actor has already accumulated considerable potential and is aware of its possibilities. According to Schahill “Blackwater in 2006 had some twenty-three hundred private soldiers deployed in nine countries around the world and boasted of a database of another twenty-one thousand additional contractors on whom it could call should the need arise. In 2006 (…) in terms of military might, the company could singlehandedly take down many of the world’s governments". Even though the company is at this point of time absolutely loyal to the US government it gravitates towards a role of “an independent army, deploying to conflict zones as an alternative to a NATO or UN force, albeit one accountable to Blackwater’s owners rather than member nations”. (Schahill 2007: p. 343)

Private armies on a model of Blackwater might become instrumental in future politics especially if these forces affiliate to financially capable non-governmental players like large MNCs. But privatization of the military will not be confined to private security companies. It would be naïve to believe that in the new social reality such illusive constraints as dependence of the military on taxpayer’s money and parliamentary constraints will prevent domestic involvement of regular armed forces. Nathan Freier speculates on such a scenario in his memo *Known Unknowns* drafted for the *Strategic Studies Institute*:

„Widespread civil violence inside the United States would force the defense establishment to reorient priorities in extremis to defend basic domestic order and human security. (…) … DoD [Department of Defence] might be forced by circumstances to put its broad resources at the disposal of civil authorities to contain and reverse violent threats to domestic tranquility. Under the most extreme circumstances, this might include use of military force against hostile groups inside the United States. Further DoD would be, by necessity, an essential enabling hub for the continuity of political authority in a multi-state or nationwide civil conflict or disturbance. A whole host of long-standing defense conventions would be severely tested. Under these conditions and at their most violent extreme, civilian authorities, on advice of the defense establishment, would need to rapidly determine the parameters defining the legitimate use of military force inside the United States” (Freier 2008:32-33)

The ongoing political transformation of the West is a symptom of the growing post-heroic mentality in the population and, accordingly, increasing reliance of the vulnerable society on heroic groups to provide its security. Particular circumstances of this non-causal organic
development may vary from one culture to another. In case of the West, militarization seems to be brought about by the complex of highly diverse phenomena circulating in public discourse under the names of “terror” or “war on terror”. Analyzing the lasting impact of this trend Herfried Münkler comes to the - normatively tinged - conclusion that “direct profits which terrorists can gain from their attack on post-heroic societies are minimal in comparison with the harm that societies may do themselves through enhancement of preventive measures against such attacks beginning with dismantling of the Habeas Corpus Acts over setting up secret prisons to the development of such a tight intelligence collecting network that privacy of citizens becomes an empty word. Eventually, transformation that would result from an impression made by a series of coordinated terror attacks can be avoided only if a kind of heroic tranquility emerges in the population which in fact, does not normally occur in post-heroic societies” (Münkler 2006: p.354; translation mine)

Thus, heroic ethos concentrates in mercenary armies and intelligence services which take over more and more of social and political functions and become increasingly autonomous.

In the light of morphological necessity – an episteme that, like any social theory, is damned to remain uncertain - current trends seem to indicate that a nation state as the main form of political organization and liberal democracy as the social and political convention of dominating states are outdated. Global risks and challenges such as proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, the world’s economic crises, mass migration and environmental problems are but contingencies of a particular historical period that shape in our age an organically predestined transition of the mankind from a multipolar to a unipolar world order. Particular forms of the Imperium mundi - an emerging global order initially framed by a post-democratic superpower - are contingent. Spengler’s excursive remarks on this issue may be interpreted in a sense that a dominating culture would organize the world according to its own paradigms that crystallize within competing nations of the same culture. Spengler envisioned three Western world order paradigms which he described in his peculiar manner using definition-like metaphors. Depending on a defining factor – “State”, “Money” or “Church” - in other words, political, economic or religious mode of consciousness – Spengler laid out a “Prussian” idea of a “socialist monarchy”, an “English” idea of a “capitalist world republic” and a “Spanish” idea of “Ultramontanism”, i.e. universal church. (Spengler 1920: pp. 66, 84) For Spengler the crucial question of the coming caesarian age was whether the world would be run by “billionaires or generals, bankers or clerks”, whether “in the future trade shall govern the state or the state shall govern trade”. (Spengler 1920: p. 67, 97; translation mine) He believed that to the future “International” Germans had to offer “the idea of the World Organization, the World State and the English that of the World Trust and World Exploitation”. (Spengler1920: p.84; translation mine) The transfer of the global leadership after the World War II from Great Britain to the United States – both nations of the Anglo-Saxon cultural origin – constituted a prerequisite for arrangement of the world as the World Trust.

However, the triumph of the economic liberalism as globalization model does not seem to be an irreversible development since, in Spengler’s view, money will have to lose its symbolic power with the rise of the caesarism when economy will no longer be able to determine politics. Nonmonetary powers should regain control over the economy:
“In form of democracy, money has won. (…) But as soon as it has destroyed the old orders of the Culture, the chaos gives forth a new and overpowering factor (…) – the Caesar-men. Before them the money collapses. *The Imperial Age, in every Culture alike, signifies the end of the politics of mind and money*. (Spengler 1922: p. 432)

“But, just *because* the illusion that actuality can allow itself to be improved by the ideas of any Zeno or Marx has fled away; because men have learned that in realm of reality one power-will *can be overthrown only by another* (…) there wakes at last a deep yearning for all old and worthy tradition that still lingers alive. Men are tired to disgust of money-economy. They hope for salvation from somewhere or other, for some real thing of honour and chivalry, of inward nobility, of unselfishness and duty”. (Spengler 1922: p. 464)

“The dictature of money marches on, tending to its material peak… (…) …But, as it is a form of thought, *it fades out as soon as it has thought its economic world to finality*, and has no more material upon which to feed. (…) To-day it presses victoriously upon industry to make the productive work of entrepreneur and engineer and labourer alike its spoil. (…) But with this, money, too, is at the end of its success… (…) The *private* powers of the economy want free paths for their acquisition of great resources. No legislation must stand in their way. They want to make the laws themselves, in their interests, and to that end they make use of the tool they have made for themselves, democracy, the subsidized party. Law needs, in order to resist this onslaught, a high tradition and an ambition of strong families that finds its satisfaction not in the heaping-up of riches, but in the tasks of true rulership, above and beyond all money-advantage”. (Spengler 1922: p. 506)

It would appear that major developments predicted by Spengler such as growing political apathy in the population of the Western democracies, transformation of political parties from program-based groups into individual-oriented teams, privatization of the politics, erosion of media diversity, triumph of financial sector over real economy, militarization and securitization of the society, replacement of conscript armies by professional state forces and private mercenary armies have become reality today. This can serve as a sufficient basis for modeling future development of the globalizaton along the lines of Spengler’s concept of Imperium mundi. Unless the Western imperial project is thwarted by competing initiatives of rising powers like China, Russia or a possible Pan-Islamic block the Occidental Imperium mundi seems in the long run to have no alternative as a political and social form of the 21st century. If Spengler’s intuitive insight into the ethos of the Western Culture is correct, if the “Faustian” man both imagines his existential universe and designs his social reality not as solid materiality but as pure space and energy then the Imperium mundi – this final creation of the “Faustian” spirit – should be thought of in terms of what first became tangible in the “dynastic states of (…) 17th and 18th Centuries” which in Spengler’s view were “political fields of force, with cabinets and great diplomats as effective centres of purposeful direction and comprehensive vision”. (Spengler 1918: p. 386) The prospective World Trust will not remind of ancient empires with their ethnic and geographical core areas, utterly present power structures and clumsy administrative apparatus. The Imperium mundi will most probably operate as a versatile worldwide network of geopolitical centers, production hubs, resource fields and military bases controlled by a small elite. The imperial power will not be affiliated with any particular nation state but it will manage
nation states as well as other forms of social organization underlying the global order. Being a stage of a culture organism’s lifetime the Imperium mundi will not persist eternally and its decline will be brought about by inevitable fragmentation of the elite and redistribution of power within an established geopolitical structure at the end of the imperial age. The question of whether this ensuing neo-feudalism will ultimately lead to a revival of the multipolar world or the global structure will persist cannot be satisfactorily answered at this point of time. The global order may survive if in the wake of political globalization a new global super-culture emerges as panoply of symbolic codes which can be taken over by and applied to leading cultures of the future.

There is little doubt that globalization will prevail. Since proclaimed humanism and liberal values have failed to profoundly transform collective human psyche for the last centuries the future of globalization as that of any grand geopolitical process may be summed up in Bismarck’s (1862) famous phrase: “Not through speeches and majority decisions will the great questions of the day be decided (...) but by iron and blood”. The “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 2003) is progressing towards “the end of history” (Fukuyama 2002) and a new global order is looming at the horizon. Yet the great risks of the imperial unification of the world even in its mildest form are conspicuous: free play of the world powers on the “grand chessboard” (Brzezinski 1997) of geopolitics challenges the familiar idea of the Man exposing the very humanity of humans to a new danger – the Civil World War.

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