Title
[Document, 1783 July 18]
Library Location
Name
Jay, John, 1745-1829 (Author)
Livingston, Robert R., 1746-1813 (Addressee)
Format
correspondence
Digital Project
Papers of John Jay
Date
July 18, 1783
Language
English
Physical Description
8 pages
Subjects
United States--History--Revolution, 1775-1783; Jay, John, 1745-1829
Summary
Provisional articles of treaty approved and ratified by Congress. Thinks can alleviate Livingston's doubts about separate article (on Florida). British attempt to annex territory on eastern shore of Mississippi, to ensure extent of British territories worth keeping "as to afford a convenient retreat to the Tories." Americans thought that this area, West Florida up to the Yazoo river, too valuable in its land and position to give up. Also wanted to ensure British understood importance of navigation of Mississippi for their own commerce so they would not make an agreement with Spain ceding that right. However, increasing value of navigation also would increase value of land bordering the river, disinclining the British to then let go of that territory. Compromise reached that British would cede all right to territory about the Yazoo and the Americans below in the case that the British had the Floridas at the end of the war. Article thus quid pro quo rather than favor to the British. Decided to keep that article secret because in full swing of negotiations between Spain France and Britain. Would have upset Spain and involved the French. Americans not prohibited from making bargains with the British that do not concern other nations. Also Spain had other pretensions over that and other areas. Agrees that "honesty is the best policy" but sees no reason to think their negotiations were not as they should be. Believes Livingston's sentiments motivated by sincerity but believes he does not have as complete an understanding of events as those who were involved in the actual negotiations. Does not want to hurt friendship with France; thinks the French minister acts with goodwill in so far as it corresponds to the promotion of French interests. Would never sacrifice "our Faith, our Gratitude or our Honor to any consideration of Convenience and may [God] also forbid that we should ever be unmindful of the Dignity and independent Spirit which should always characterize a free and generous People." Shall propose another article to postpone payment of British debts as Congress wishes. Admits to ambiguities in articles but should be seen in light of British desire to protect the Tories and ours to not absolutely favor them. The phrase "real British Subjects" clearly to not include American refugees. Sixth article about "no future confiscations" ought to have had fixed a time more definitely but sees it as determined by end of hostilities and not binding before. Evacuation of New York assured by Mr. Hartley; did not fix a time for it as perhaps British would have left it until after definitive treaty, to United States' disadvantage. Surprised at doubt in America over when hostilities ceased there, is one month after the date of its declaration in all parts of the world, land or sea, north of "latitude of the Canaries". Those ships in northern latitudes confiscated afterwards should be reclaimed, as well as "the transportation of Negroes from New York" [followed by first draft of letter to Robert Livingston]. Livingston's doubts arise from belief that: negotiators were overly distrustful and suspicious, that agreement signed without prior knowledge of French court and that the separate article was not important but was offensive to Spain, in addition to being kept secret from both nations. Reminder that the American commissioners insisted on four things from the British a priori that the French minister believed premature or excessive: treatment of America as independent nation, agreement to boundaries claimed by the United States, fishing rights, and no definite reinstatement of Tories. Evident that the French did not have American best interest in mind, whatever the minister's motive. Reason for not communicating articles to French before signing: Lord Shelbourne feared would have to resign if no speedy conclusion to war and saw negotiations as furthering this end. The British made concessions would not have otherwise made. Also, the King agreed to ratify only what Mr. Oswald should sign and seal, not a verbal agreement. French, if given articles, would have postponed signing of agreement until French, Spanish and British treaty could be signed as well. Delay giving opening for British to consider themselves not bound by present articles and allowing France to pressure British to not concede to our demands. Because signed in secret, avoided the necessity of offending the French by refusal to postpone signing. Was "no breach of our treaty with France." Although admits that they diverged from instructions of Congress, believes instructed to act for their own sake and not that of France. Confidence between allies already marred by French minister's hiding of his articles, so should not be surprised if the Americans did the same. [Franklin's comments on part of letter that did not go out] May not be the best idea to attempt justification at present time, because matter is quiet in Europe, no letter sent to Congress ever a secret, charges of Livingston's reaction to them would be seen as insult and denied. Situation still critical in Europe, should not be jeopardized. Censure not that of Congress but of private citizen. Laurens also is not there so cannot be part of justification. Save this part of letter for the future.
Identifier
columbia.jay.10341